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F
ollowing the failures of numerous depository
mstltutlons Il1 the 19HOs, many analysts drew the
conclusion that there was a relationship het\veen
rapid grmvth of lending activity and deterioration
of loan quality The relationship hetween loan
growth and loan quality is complex. however, and
estahlishing the relationship hetween growth and
quality n:quires examining different sources of
gnm·th and estimating the actual loan qu;t1ity \\ ith
commonly used quality ratios. such as nonper-
forming IO;ln ratios and charge-ofl rates
Preliminary evidence hased on data hom
Texas hanks indicates tInt loan growth through
additional lending to ne\v or existing customers
(intern;lIly generated gn)\\ th) initi;t1ly improves
measured credit quality hut 100\'ers quality after a
lag This result is completely consistent \vith the
charge that some hanks gre\v too quickly and were
unahle to maintain credit quality The positive
initial effects and the lag in the relationship hetvveen
loan grmnh and quality deterioration suggest that
early detection of decline in quality is difficult
and a challenge to hank man;lgers, directors, ami
exammers
The relationship hetween loan growth and
loan quality deterioration ;\ppears to depend on
a hank's equity position. Rapidly growing hanks
\vith high levels of equity did not show evidence
of a deterioration in loan quality. This result
supports current programs of capital-hased
supervision of hanks
Loan growth through the acquisition of other
banks (externally generated growth) has different
effects on loan quality. depending on the type of
acquisition. The acquisition of failed banks with
assistance from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) typically improves credit
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quality In contrast, loan growth through mergers
and acquisitions of hanks without any FDIC
assistance typically lowers loan quality. The
henefits of FDIC assistance in bank acquisition
may be slowing the rate of consolidation of the
hanking industry hy encouraging banks to delay
acquisitions of trouhled hanks until the FDIC
provides assist;lnce
Theoretical link between loangrowth
and loan quality
Logical arguments can be made relating loan
gnl\\"th to future loan qualiry For example, a bank
sl'eking to increase its market share might lower
its underwriting standards to attract more loan
customers. The underwriting standards are
emhodied in the nonprice terms of a loan, includ-
ing collater;t1 requirements, personal guarantees of
horrowers, and loan covenants. If a bank lowers
nonprice terms to attract new loan customers,
then it is increasing the risk exposure of the bank
hy lowering loan quality.
Even if a hank attempts to maintain the same
credit standards, the new borrowers it attracts may
he of lower ;\verage quality as a result of adverse
selection. If a hank is attl'mpting to gain the
husiness of borrowers that have established bank-
ing relationships, it is arguable that the lowest-
quality customers will be easiest to attract. Banks
I wish to thank GeraldP ODriscoll, Jr, Kevlll J Yeats, and
Thomas F. Siems for helplul comments and discussionswill work hardest to keep their highest-quality
borrowers. Lower-quality borrowers, on the other
hand, will be bid away from their existing bank
more easily. The bank attempting to grow will
more likely attract lower-quality borrowers on
average and, therefore, experience lower loan
quality in the future.
Alternatively, a bank that fails to provide
sufficient resources for credit administration
during periods of rapid growth may have higher
nonperforming loans in the future. If the bank
pursues more rapid loan growth but fails to
increase resources devoted to credit administration,
the new loans may not be properly monitored
over time. Close monitoring is needed to spot
troubled credits early, before they grow in size.
The misallocation of inputs can result in lower
loan quality even if the bank has not lowered its
underwriting standards
It has been suggested that the collapse of
the Bank of New England is a possible example
of these problems. According to a report by the
General Accounting Office, the Bank of New
England more than quadrupled in size from 1985
to 1989. Bank examiners cited as problems a lack
of independent loan review and out-of-date credit
documentation (American Banker, September 20,
1991, p. 14). During this period, the bank made
many loans that ultimately defaulted. These loan
losses might have been significantly reduced if
credit administration and monitoring had increased
in proportion to lending.
Analyses of thrift failures suggest that some
depository institutions consciously adopted high-
risk, high-growth strategies after their capital
positions had fallen to near or below zero. Some
banks have found themselves in a similar position.
If bank equity holders have little to lose because
their capital has eroded, they may undertake a
high-risk strategy in an effort to grow out of their
troubles. In the event that the new loans default,
the loss will be borne primarily by the FDIC. If
these loans are repaid, the bank equity holders may
reap sufficient income to recapitalize the bank.
This strategy is possible only because federal
deposit insurance allows the bank to raise what-
ever deposits are needed to fund the strategy.
This is a classic example of moral hazard-that is,
the provision of insurance changes the behavior
of the insured (Kane 1985).
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It is fully possible, however, for loan growth
to have no effect on loan quality or even positive
effects. During the recovery and expansion phases
of a business cycle, lending increases because of
strong loan demand. The strength of the economy
also increases loan quality. Consequently, loan
growth may be correlated with an improvement in
loan quality, as nonperforming loans are likely to
decline in a strong economy.
The effect of the economy on loan demand
and loan quality is not limited to business cycles.
Structural changes in the financial markets could
also generate a positive relationship between loan
growth and loan quality. For example, removing
restrictions from banks that limited their ability to
serve the needs of borrowers could increase loan
growth at banks. At the same time, it might open
access to new customers for banks that are, on
average, higher-quality borrowers or that permit
greater diversification.
Strong loan demand may not always result
in improved loan quality. If the driving force
behind strong loan demand is a speculative bubble,
then the relationship between loan growth and
loan quality is distorted. Stiglitz (1990) casually
defines a bubble as occurring when "the reason
that the price is high today is onZv because inves-
tors believe that the selling price will be high
tomorrow-when 'fundamental' factors do not
seem to justify such a price" (p. 13). Shiller (1989)
has shown evidence that speculative bubbles may
exist for stocks, bonds, and residential real estate.
The decade of the 1980s saw an increase in asset-
based lending in both real estate and corporate
loan transactions. Because repayment of asset-
based loans depends primarily on the future
selling price of the asset being financed, the
collapse of a speculative bubble could lead to
deterioration of loan quality, especially among
asset-based loans, such as real estate loans and
loans for corporate restructuring.
It is unclear if loan growth should be blamed
for the decline in loan quality following the bursting
of a speculative bubble. Certainly, if the loan
growth had been more moderate, the bubble might
have been smaller or might never have been
formed. On the other hand, the driving force behind
the bubble was the expectations of the borrowers.
Furthermore, the bursting of a speculative bubble
often results in an economic downturn that will
Federal Reserve BankofDallaslikely cause deterioration in the loan portfolios of
all banks, regardless of their growth rates.
From an analytical point of view, it is difficult
to separate speculative buhhles from other factors
that cause business cycles Furthermore. some
economists argue that bubhles do not exist. They
argue that what appears to be the bursting of a
bubble is really a market reaction 10 new informa-
tion causing the sharp decline in prices. I will not
attempt to separate the effect'i ofspeculative bubbles
from other movements in the business cycle.
The cyclical movements in loan demand and
loan quality could result in the erroneous conclu-
sion that loan growth and loan quality are neces-
sarily related. Loan growth could result from strong
economic growth, and loan quality could deterio-
rate from an economic downturn. Consequently,
a business-cycle boom followed by a hust will
create a pattern of loan growth followed hy
deteriorating loan quality. Loan growth and loan
quality may appear causally related when, in fact,
they are both just correlated with the business
cycle driven by other forces. A statistical analysis
designed to explain the changes in loan quality
needs to adjust for business-cycle effects.
Of course. fraud could be a special case of
loan growth being correlated with declines in loan
quality. Extremely rapid loan growth was observed
;It many savings ancl loan associations before their
failures In some of these cases, criminal fraud was
the driving force behind the loan growth. I Ely
(990) estimated that the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation incurred losses of $5
billion from criminal fraud at insolvent thrifts,
representing a small share of its total losses, esti-
mated to be $147 billion. Low loan quality in
these cases is the result of the fraudulent intent of
the lenders and, in all likelihood, the borrowers
also. The rapid loan growth is a possible symptom
of the fraud, hut it is not the cause of the poor
loan quality.
Methodofloan growth
The specific method utilized to increase the
loan portfolio could have an effect on the relation-
ship between loan growth and future loan quality.
Loan growth could be generated by increasing
lending to existing customers or to new customers.
Alternatively, the loan portfolio could be increased
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hy acquisition or merger. The acquisition might be
a healthy hank or a failed bank with the assistance
of the FDIC. Again, the impact on loan quality
might be quite different, depending on the source
of loan growth.
In this article, growth is separated into three
categories: growth through acquisition of a failed
bank with FDIC assistance, growth through an
unassisted acquisition or merger, or internally
generated growth. In some cases, the effect ofeach
type of growth on loan quality can be suggested,
but in other cases, it is difficult to hypothesize.
Loan growth through the acquisition of a
failed bank with the assistance of the FDIC is
unlikely to affect loan quality adversely. In most
of these transactions, the FDIC removes the low-
quality credits from the loan portfolio and agrees
to take back loans that decline in quality after the
acquisition is executed. In some other cases, the
FDIC does not take any of the low-quality loans
hut, instead, provides the acquiring institution
with sufficient resources to charge off the non-
performing loans.
Alternatively, a bank could increase its loan
portfolio through acquisition of other banks. The
acquiring bank can limit its exposure to low-
quality loans on the acquired hank's books. Often,
the acquired bank is required to charge off troubled
credits before the acquisition is executed. In other
cases, the acquired hank estahlishes a collecting
bank to hold the troubled credits. The collecting
bank is capitalized by the shareholders of the
acquired bank to isolate the effects of the problem
credits from the acquiring bank or bank holding
company.
Of course, not all bank mergers can be
characterized as one bank acquiring another. In
I For example, a Ponzi scheme is premisedon rapidgrowth
to generate sullicient cash flows to cover up the lack of
investment results Ponzi promised to double investors'
money in a short period He then used the inflow of new
deposits to give initial investors the promised doubling 01
funds, all the while extracting substantial management
fees Ponzi could keep the scheme going so long as the
rapidgrowthofnewinvestorsprovidedsufficientcash flows
to payoffthe eartier investors (Kaufman 1986)
11the case of a merger between equals, the loan
quality of the combined bank will be the average
of the loan quality of the two banks, weighted by
their relative sizes. In this case, loan quality is less
likely to change substantially.
The effect of internal growth on loan quality
is the most difficult to predict If a bank were to
restrict itself to loan growth from the growth of
existing borrower relationships, it would be limiting
its growth potential to that of its borrowers. Its
diversity could also be limited. Seeking out new
borrowers, however, has the hazards described
above, such as adverse selection.
Alternatively, internal loan growth could result
from increased lending activity in the loan partici-
pation market A bank might be able to increase
loans outstanding without lowering its underwrit-
ing standards.
2 Furthermore, the loan participation
market could offer a bank the ability to diversify
its loan portfolio across geographic regions and
across industries in a manner that lowers overall
credit risk. If, however, the loan participation
market is driven by loans to finance a speculative
bubble, then using the vehicle for loan growth
could lead to lower loan quality in the future.
Many of the highly leveraged transactions of the
1980s that are now in default or are being renego-
tiated were financed by large pools of banks.
Measuring loan quality
The analysis utilizes two standard measures
of loan quality: the ratio of charge-offs to total
loans and the ratio of nonpelforming loans to total
loans. These measures are proxies for the actual
probability of a loan defaulting. A charge-off is
the amount of a loan that a bank determines is
unlikely to be repaid and counts as a loss. Non-
performing loans are defined as loans that are 90
days or more past due or have nonaccrual status.
Two measures gauging different stages of
2 This argumentis basedon the notion thatthe elasticityofthe
supplyofloans in the participation market is very high and
a large amountofloans can be added to Ihe bank's books
without reducing its underwriting standards
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loan quality deterioration were used because any
single measure may be inadequate in determining
loan quality. Banks have some discretion to shift
problem loans from the first stage to the second
stage. In the first stage of deteriorating loan quality,
loans become nonperforming-the borrowers fail
to make timely payment of interest and principal.
If the loan appears unlikely to be repaid in full,
then in a second stage of deterioration, the loan
or a pOltion of the loan is charged off. A hank can
lower its nonperforming loan ratio hy charging off
more of its nonperforming loans. Consequently,
both the charge-off rate and the nonperforming
loan ratio were used to assess loan quality.
These financial ratios, however, can be dis-
torted hy growth if there are lagged relationships
between financial variahles. As a result, the ratios
are imperfect proxies for the actual probability of
a loan defaulting. Loans are rarely charged off in
their first year. It is far more likely for a loan to
default and be charged off long after the loan was
first extended. Consequently, there is a lagged
relationship hetween the measure of loan quality
and total loans.
These loan quality measures do not adjust
for the lag in the relationship hetween extending
loans and loans defaulting. Consider the charge-
off rate, for example; it is the ratio of charged-off
loans, which are loans extended in previous years
that are only now being recognized as a loss, to
total current loans, which include loans that were
made only recently and, therefore, are unlikely to
have defaulted as yet. Essentially, the rate measures
yesterday's mistakes relative to today's base. Con-
sequently, growth in total loans can distort this
ratio. If, as stated ahove, today's hase is growing,
yesterday's mistakes appear smaller in comparison
with the current hase. Loan growth would lower
the charge-off rate for as long as the growth could
be maintained, and the charge-off rate would he
lower than the actual probability of default.
A numerical example can illuminate this point
and is presented in Table 1. Suppose Bank A starts
with $100 of loans and its growth rate is 1 percent
per year; the prohahility of a loan loss is only 0.01.
Assume that all loans have a three-year maturity
and uncollectible loans are charged off in the
third year. In the case of Bank A, its charge-off
rate would become stable at 1 percent, exactly
equal to the probability of loan loss. Suppose
Federal Reserve BankofDallasTable 1
Simulation of the Effect of Temporary Increases in loan Growth Rates
on the Measured Charge-off Rate
Bank A Bank B Banke BankO
Charge· Charge- Charge- Charge-
off off off off
Period Loans Rate Loans Rate Loans Rate Loans Rate
1 100 100 100 100
2 101 110 110 110
3 102 121 121 121
4 102 .98 132 .76 132 .76 132 .76
5 102 .99 144 .76 144 .76 144 .76
6 102 1.00 157 .77 157 .77 157 .77
7 102 1.00 171 .77 171 .77 171 .77
8 102 1.00 187 .77 204 .71 204 .71
9 102 1.00 204 .77 223 .70 223 .70
10 102 100 223 .77 244 .70 244 .70
11 102 1.00 243 .77 266 .77 266 153
12 102 1.00 265 .77 290 .77 290 .77
13 102 1.00 289 .77 317 .77 317 .77
14 102 1.00 315 .77 346 .77 346 .77
Bank A: 1-percent growth of loans and constant probability of default equal to 01.
Bank B: constant loan growth of 10 percent and constant probability of default equal to 01
Bank C: one-time increase in grow1h rate from 10 percent to 20 percent in Period 8 and constant probability of default equal to 01
Bank D: one-time increase in grow1h rate from 10 percent to 20 percent and one·time increase in probability of default from 01 to
02 in Period 8
Ibnk B is illentictl to B~lnk i\ l.'~C<.:pt it grows ~ll
~I lO-pl'l'Cl.'nt annual r~ltl.': Ihl.'11 iiS charge-oIl r~ltl.'
\\oulll suhilize at O.~~ pCTcc'nt, Ibnk B can
1ll~linLlin this Im\l.'r chargl.'-oll ratl' a,s long a,s it
cm Illainuin tIll' lO-pl.'rCl.'I1I gro\vlh rate
This al1icle addrl.',s,sl's the qUl.'stion of whl.'llll'r
lhl.' dl.'Llult ratl.' changl.',s in responsl.' to rapid IO~1Jl
gro\\'1h A comparison 01 1\\ 0 morl' simulations
SIH)\\S lhl.' distinction of thl.' dilkn:nce. SUPPOSl.'
holh Ibnk C and ltmk I) e~peril.'ncl.'a lemporary
inlTl.'asc in thl.' gnJ\qh r:lle of loans 1'1'0111 lO-
IXTll.'nl grm\·th 10 20-pellc'nl grmvlh in lhe eighlh
pl.'riod lx-fore returning 10 ~I sleady lO-percenl
gnl\\ Ih ratl' Tn the casc' of Bank C, assullle thl'
proh~lhilityof a loan ddaulIing remains conslant
~ll 0,0 I. while in the casc' of Bank I), assume the
proh~lhilityof default rises from OOT to 0.02 for
lhe period of high growth and relurns to 001 :Ifter
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the high grm\ lh In Bank Cs case. the charge-ofT
Lite \vill tel11poraril\' fall from 0,77 pern:nt to 070
!)L'rcent and thl.'n return to 0.7"7 percent. In Bank
I)'s case, the charge-off rate declines initially to
0.70 percent, as in the case of Bank C, hUI lhen it
rises sharply in lhe third period after the growth
to 1. ')3 percent when the lagged effects of exlend-
ing credit to riskier horrmvers are realized,
l:kcause of this lagged relationship. Sllsl:lined
rapid gr()\vth can mask changes in the prolnhililY
of default hy dri\'ing lhe charge-off rate in thl.'
Opposile din:ction For l.'~ample, more rapid
growth could dri'l.' the prohability of default up
only a small pl.'rcl.'nUge rdativl' to the percenUge
increase in the rail' of growth. As a result, toul
charge-offs would rise in absolute magnitudl.', hut
charge-offs rebti\'l.' 10 total loans would fall
Of course. mainl:lining rapid loan growth
13forever is impossible. Eventually, some shock to
economic growth limits loan growth. In Texas, for
example, these shocks were the decline in oil
prices and the collapse of real estate values. When
loan growth rates fall, the effects of growth on
charge-off rates are reversed and magnified. A
slowdown in loan growth causes the charge-off
rate to rise temporarily, even though the proba-
bility of default may be unchanged.
The model
As the dependent variables, the nonperforming
loan ratio and the charge-off rate were regressed on
a series of independent variables that measure the
effects of loan growth by method of growth, bank
financial characteristics, and business conditions.
To capture the dynamic relationship between loan
quality, as measured by the nonperforming loan
ratio and the charge-off rate, and loan grmvth rates,
multiple lags of the loan growth rates were used in
the regression to determine the relationship be-
tween loan growth and loan quality. The estimation
used data from Texas banks for 1976 through 1990.
Loan growth is separated into three catego-
ries: growth through FDIC-assisted merger, growth
through unassisted merger, and internal growth.
Growth through FDIC-assisted merger of a failed
bank is defined as the total loans transferred to the
surviving bank as a percentage of the total loans
at that bank at the end of the previous period.
Similarly, growth through unassisted merger is
defined as the total loans transferred to the surviv-
ing bank as a percentage of the total loans at that
bank in the previous period. Internal growth is
measured as the residual growth after growth
through assisted and unassisted mergers is
removed-that is, total loans in time period t less
loans acquired through assisted and unassisted
mergers, stated as a percentage increase over total
loans in time period t - 1.
The composition of the loan portfolio may
also affect loan quality. During the period under
study, oil prices dropped sharply, and the com-
mercial real estate market was devastated by over-
building and high vacancy rates. Consequently, a
bank that was heavily exposed to energy or real
estate borrowers would likely have higher non-
performing loan ratios or charge-off rates than a
hank whose loan portfolio was better diversified.
To account for the effect of differences in loan
composition on loan quality, the proportion of
commercial and industrial loans to total loans and
the proportion of real estate loans to total loans
were included.
A hank scale variable (logarithm of total
assets) was also included to capture any effects of
hank size, such as minimum efficient scales of
operations or important reputational effects. It is
possible that large banks may be ahle to achieve
efficient scales of workout operations that are not
feasible for smaller banks. As a result, large banks
may keep nonperforming loans on their books
while they work out repayment schedules. Smaller
banks may find it more efficient to charge off the
loss Conversely, large hanks are more likely to be
raising funds in the money markets, and these
markets appear to respond more favorably when
hanks charge off troubled loans rather than carry
them as nonperforming assets. Therefore, large
hanks, if they have sufficient reserves, may have
greater incentive to charge off troubled loans to
gain more favorable terms in the money markets.
Loan quality will also be a function of the
current state of the economy Business conditions
are introduced into the model by including the
growth rate of Texas nonagricultural employment
in the regressions.; Texas employment data are
puhlished hy the Texas Employment Commission.
The structure of the model is as follows. The
dependent variables measuring loan quality-the
nonperforming loan ratio and the charge-off
rate-are regressed on the following independent
variahles:
3 Measures of economic conditions at the county level, in-
cluding countyemploymentandgross taxable sales in the









and three lagged values
Loan growth through bank merger
Federal Reserve BankofDallasA logit-type transformation was performed on the
dependent variables because their values were
limited in the range of 0 to 1 '
It is possible that the negative relationship
between loan growth and loan quality may not
exist for banks growing at relatively normal rates
but only for rapidly growing banks. High-growth
banks were identified and tested separately from
the rest of the sample to examine this hypothesis
Banks with internal loan growth rates exceeding
four times the growth rate ofTexas personal income
were classified as high-growth banks. Banks with
internal loan growth rates less than four times the
income rate were classified as normal.'
Similarly, to measure the possible effects of
moral hazard on bank behavior, the sample of
rapid-growth banks was split into high and low
capital categories. A bank was classified as a high-
capital bank if its equity capital-to-asset ratio
exceeded the average for its peer group. The
three peer groups used were based on total asset
size: banks with less than $100 million in assets,
banks with at least $100 million in assets but less
than $1 billion, and banks with more than $1
billion in assets.6
The regressions were run with annual data
from the Reports of Condition and Income filed
by Texas banks for 1976 through 1990. Texas
personal income data were obtained from the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The regressions













and three lagged values
Loan growth through acquisition
of failed banks and three lagged
values
Log of total bank assets
Business loans as a percentage of
total loans




Total equity capital as a percentage
of total assets
dent variable were estimated for 1984 to 1990, the
period for which data were available. The charge-
off rate regressions were estimated with data for
the entire period.
Regression results
The empirical results do provide evidence
that rapid loan growth will result in a deterioration
of loan quality. As expected, internal loan growth
worsened measured loan quality with a lag. These
empirical results support the popular notion that
rapid loan growth results in low-quality loan
portfolios that can lead to bank failure.
All the regressions utiliZing nonperforming
loan ratios and charge-off rates as the dependent
variables were statistically significant. The regres-
sion results for the nonperforming loan ratio are
presented in Table 2. The adjusted R 2 values
indicate that even in the best-fitting equation, less
than 20 percent of the total variation is explained.
Low R2 values, however, are common in regres-
sions using cross-section data. The regressions for
the charge-off rate are presented in Table 3 and fit
the data slightly better than the nonperforming
loan ratio regressions.
r
lfthe dependent variable is X. then the logit transformation
of that variable is In[X/(1 - X)). This procedure mono-
! tonically transforms the values of X. constrained to be
between 0 and 1. to range from negative to positive infinity
S The relationship maynotbesymmetric for both loan growth
andloan contraction, andsome formulations restricting the
observations to positive loan growth were estimated Some
versions of the model were estimated with observations
limited to positive internal loan growth banks only The
results were essentially the same as the estimate for the full
sample
6 Examining the moral hazardhypothesis is not the focus of
this article It is important to note thatjust because a bank
hasa capital ratio belowthe peergroup average, the bank
is notnecessarilygoingto exhibitmoralhazardbehavior. To
examine moral hazard behavior more fully, a sample of
banks operating with little ifany capital would be needed
It is possiblethata sampleofsavingsandloan associations
wouldoffera sufficientnumberofobservations to studythe
moral hazardproblem
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Regression Results for Nonperforming Loan Ratio, 1984-90
High-Growth Banks'
Normal-Growth
All Texas Banks Total High-Equity Low-Equity Banks
GROWTHO -.01766 ••• -.00574 ••• -.00723 ... -.00546 ••• -.02926 ..•
GROWTH1 -.00695 ••• -.00251 ••• -.00360 • -.00235 •• -,00765 •••
GROWTH2 -.00086· -.00072 -.00238 -.00044 -.00004
GROWTH3 .00006 .00040 .00045 .00043 .00003
GRO-MRG .00092 .00421 • .00415 .00441 -.00125
GR1-MRG .00155 .00090 00258 -.00159 .00131
GR2-MRG .00342··· .00288 .00264 .00154
GR3-MRG .00101 -.00445 -.00479 .00095
GRO-FL -.01383 ••• -.02150 •••
GR1-FL -.00695 ••• -.00233 -.00453 .00262 -.00832 •••
GR2-FL -.00059 -.00026 -.00355 .00007
GR3-FL -.00290 -.00686 -.00627 - 00284
TA .05992 ••• .09393 ••• .02410 .13085 ••• ,Om4'"
CMLRAT .00865 ••• .00186 .00777 • -.00107 .00906 no
RLRAT .00985·" .00278 .00837 •• -.00041 ,00896 •••
EMPGROW .00513 -.05209 ••• -.05562.- -.05061 •.. .02097 ...
Intercept -5.08019 ••• -5.52885 ••• -5.06423 ••• -5.73915 ... -528745 •••
Adjusted R2 .1610 0625 .0801 .0530 .1763
Fstatistic 143.702 ••• 10.479 ••• 5.750 ••• 6.715 ••• 131.719 •••
Observations 11,903 2,133 601 1,532 9,770
, Banks were classified as high-growth banks if their rate of internally generated loan growth exceeded four times the growth rate of
Texas personal income.
• Significant at the .10 level.
•• Significant at the 05 level
••• Significant at the .01 level
As predictl'(I, tlK' initial <.:ffects of interml
gro\Ylll imprU\ ed IO~1Il qualitv \yhen me~lsured h\
tlle current nonperforming loan ratio and the
charge-off r;lle. The coelTicienl on the vari~lhlc
- The movemenlll1 the charge-offrate presentedIS basedon
tile regression results Because ofIhe logit transformation.
the coefficienls indicate the qualitative direction of the
effeci bUI cannot be interpreted quantitatively
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(,'NOli 'fJ-/O is m:gati\ e and significant in l'\'CTY
rl'grc'ssion for hoth the nonperforming loan ratio
~lIld the cll~lrge-offrate. The bggl'tj clrl'cls of loan
growth. ho\\ever. increase the charge-off rate. In
the charge-off r~lte regression for :111 Tl'X~IS IXIIlKs.
the codTicient on CHOWTHj is signil'icant and
positive, indicating that in this c:lse the bgged
clrl'tt of loan growth .vas to r~lise the charge-orf
r~l1l' A temporary increase in the growth r:lte of
1()~lns, heginning at time t. \vill CIUSl' thl' charge-
off Lltl' to 1l100'e in the pallern depicted in Figure
1.- The regression coefficients indiclll' thl' S~lme
Federal Reserve Bank ofDallasTable 3
Regression Results for Loan Charge-off Rate, 1980-90
High-Growth Banks'
Normal-Growth
All Texas Banks Total High-Equity Low-Equity Banks
GROWTHO -.01860 ••• -.00496 .** -.00738 **. -.00428 *** -.03231 ***
GROWTH1 -.00640 ••• -.00348 *** -.00669 *** -.00296 *** -.00651 ***
GROWTH2 .00017 -.00113 -.00472 ** -.00064 .00142 ***
GROWTH3 .00013 •• -.00064 ** -.00004 .00124 *** .00010*
GRO-MRG .00252 *•• .00474 *** .00464 ** .00441 .00015
GR1-MRG .00296 *** .00524 * .00421 .00539 .00246 ***
GR2-MRG .00275 *. .00138 .00155 .00230
GR3-MRG .00012 -.01563 ** -.01540 * .00012
GRO-FL -.01469 ... -.02375 ***
GR1·FL -.00504 .*. -.00251 • -.00495 ** -.00218 -.00644 ***
GR2-FL .00158 -.01233 -.01198 .00276 **
GR3-FL -.00125 -.01937 ** -.01857 ** -.00062
TA -.06761 ... -.02123 -.04370 -.01221 -.04907 ***
CMLRAT .00038 -.00646 *** -.00030 -.00891 *** .00075
RLRAT .00019 -.00683 *** -.00539 * -.00794 *** -.00458 **
EMPGROW -.04209 ... -.05284 *** -.04641 *** -.05271 *** -.03067 ***
Intercept -3.76497 ... -4.31454 *** -4.07762 *** -4.37177 *** -3.93773 ***
Adjusted R2 .1837 .0995 .1197 .0883 .2274
Fstatistic 182.432 ••• 16.634 *** 8.328 *** 10.863 *** 199.285 ***
Observations 12,902 2,123 594 1,529 10,779
1 Banks were classified as high-growth banks if their rate of internally generated loan growth exceeded four times the growth rate of
Texas personal income
• Significant at the .10 level
.. Significant at the 05 level
... Significant at the 01 level
IXlttLTn of imprm el1lL'nt foj]m\ ed h •ueteril nai< n
th~lt is prL'.sL'l1led ill the simulation of the fictional
B;1Ilk I).
ThL' L'mpirictl results also indicate tlUl ;\
.suSt;\iIlL'd illlTL'aSe ill the gnl'nh rate or lending
could lTGltL' the ~\ppearance that credit Cjualit\ has
imprm L'LI. II tIlL' intL'rnal loan grmyth rate risL's ami
rL'm;lin.s ;\l ~l nL'\\ higher le\el. the effect on tilL'
clnrgL'-oll r~lte \\ould he the sum of the coL'ificients
L'stim;llL'LI ror the internal grmnh rate Yari;lhIL' ~Iml
its bgged \ ;t1ues. The hypothesis thal the .sum of
lhe codlicieills is equal to zero was tested \vith ~ln
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F lest and rejected. indicating that a steady-slate
increasL' in the grmnh rate of internal lending
\\ oulLl result in a lo"--er measured charge-ofl rate,
The pattLTn of the mCAement in the charge-off
ratL' resulting from sustained growth \\ oulLl he
much different than OCCUlTed \\ ith temporary
growth As .shm\ n in figure 2. the charge-oil rate
\\ ould raj] heginning at time t and remain helow
the original charge-off rate for as long as the
higJwr growth rate could he maintained.
There is strong eyidence that grmvth lhrough
h;lJ1k merger lowers asset qualilY. hased on lhe
17Figure 1
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effect on the charge-off rate. The initial and the
lagged effects of growth through bank mergers
were significant and positive, indicating higher
charge-off rates. The nonperforming loan ratio,
however, was not initially affected by growth
through merger. The lagged effect of growth
through mergers raised the nonperforming loan
ratio in the second year after the merger.
Growth through mergers does not generate
the initial improvement effect because the acquiring
bank is acquiring loans extended by the acquired
bank in previous years. As a result, there is no lag
between when these loans are placed on a bank's
books and when the loan might default.
Growth through the acquisition of failed banks
appears to be highly successful in improving asset
quality only in the short run. The initial and one-
year lagged effects of growth through failed-bank
acquisition were to lower both the nonperforming
loan ratio and the charge-off rate. The longer lagged
effects were not significantly different from zero.
Bank size appears to affect loan quality dif-
ferently, depending on whether quality is measured
by the nonperforming loan ratio or the charge-off
rate. The positive and significant coefficients on
the total assets variable eTA) indicate that larger
banks had higher nonperforming loan ratios, and
these banks had significantly lower charge-off
rates. This result suggests that larger banks may not
18
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be as aggressive in charging off nonperforming
loans as are small banks. One reason would be
that large banks may have a competitive advantage
in working out troubled credits and, consequently,
carry such loans as nonperforming longer and
charge off fewer of these loans.
The effect of loan portfolio concentrations on
loan quality suggests that banks concentrated in
business and real estate lending were slow to
charge off nonperforming loans. Troubled real
estate and business loans may be more likely to be
successfully rescheduled and ultimately collected.
If this is the case, these loans should be reported
as nonperforming and need not be charged off.
Credit quality, when measured by the charge-
off rate, moved with the business cycle, as expected.
Declines in the growth rate ofTexas nonagricultural
employment correlated with higher charge-off rates.
In the nonperforming ratio regression, however,
the business-cycle variable was not significant.
The regression results are also consistent
with the premise that moral hazard contributes to
asset quality problems. If moral hazard were pre-
valent, then banks with low equity would be
more likely to have pursued risky strategies. The
sample of high-growth banks was split into two
groups: banks with above-average equity-to-assets
ratios and banks with below-average ratios. Both
high-equity and low-equity banks showed the
Federal Reserve BankofDallasTable 4
Regression Results for Moral Hazard Test Using the Charge-off Rate, 1980-90
GROWTHO -.019935 ••• GRO-FL -.014355 •••
GROWTH1 -.006667 ••• GR1-FL -.005046 •••
GROWTH2 .000110 GR2-FL .002012
GROWTH3 .000813 ••• GR3-FL -.000019
EQUITY -.176713 ••• GRO-FL x EQUITY .000086
GROWTHO x EQUITY .004849 ••• GR1-FL x EQUITY -.000602
GROWTH1 x EQUITY .000010 GR2-FL x EQUITY -.004156
GROWTH2x EQUITY - 002458 •• GR3-FL x EQUITY -.003980
GROWTH3x EQUITY -.000793 •••
TA -.056514 •••
GRO-MRG .003305 ... CMLRAT -.000836
GR1-MRG .003181 ... RLRAT -.000930
GR2-MRG .002248 • EMPGROW -.042943 •••
GR3-MRG -.000068 Intercept -3.745804 •••
GRO-MRG x EQUITY -.001337 Adjusted R2 .1920
GR1-MRGx EQUITY -.000765 Fstatistic 106.720 ...
GR2-MRG x EQUITY .001060 Observations 12.902
GR3-MRG x EQUITY .003831
• Significant at the.10 level
•• Significant at the .05 level
... Significant at the 01 level.
NOTE: EQUITY ~ 1 for above·average equity banks and 0 for below-average equity banks
s:tme initi:d dleet of illlproH'lllent in the charge-
oil r:lt<.... The charge-olT r:lte :It the I(l" -equit\·
hanks rose \yith a lag df...ct At the high-equit\
h:l11k.s. 11O\\·en:r. thcl'e "'a.s no .significant effect
tlut raisL'd the chargL'-of! r:lte,
,\n additional test or \IlL' mor:d hazard hypothe-
.si.s :ll.so .shm\-s e\ idence of Illi.s h..ha\-ior A hinary
\ ari:thle \\ as defined :l.S ..qual to I for abo\'e-
:IH'I':lg,' equity bank.s :l11d () ror tile helov','-:Ivcrage
"quit\· h:tnks for tIll.' toul sample In the new
r..grL'ssi( Hl. tile dependelll \ ariahie-the charge-off
r:lle-\\ :IS regressed ag:linst the independent
\':1 ri:1hies Irom the ple\ ious regre.ssions and tIll'
product of the binary \ :\1i:lhk \\ ith the current and
bgged \ :dues of the gro\\ th r:lt,' \ ariahies, The
resull.s or this estimation :lrL' presented in T:t ble.s ·1
:In(\ ') The initial effect significantly lowered the
(Ilarge-oll rate at both till' high-equity banks allli
thL'I()\\-equit\· hanks TIll' lagged etTeer. h(l""\"I.
signiricl11th incre:lsed till' cll:lrge-off rate for the
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low-equity IXl11ks. At high-equity banks. the longest
lagged effect \\ as insignificant. This result further
supports the mor:d h:ll.ard hypothesis If a hank
Ila.s a large amount of its o,','n equity exposed to
ri.sk. it is cardul not lO Imn~r its credit stand:lrds.
en..n during periods of strong growth
Policy implications and conclusions
The evid,'nce from Texas banks presented
here indicates tll:lt a sutisticdly significant reb-
tionshir exists het\\een loan gro\\th and loan
charge..otl rates :lfter a lag. These empirical results
:Ire in agreelllent with specific examples of r:lpidly
g o\\-ing hank.s that L'xlx-rienced declines in 10:111
quality and eyentually faile'd. Even after allmv:l11ce
for busim:ss-cycle dkcts and hank fin:l11cial
strueture, the syst,'matic relationshir hl'lween loan
gro",th and deterior:lling loan quality held :lI11ong
Tex:ls hanks during the I(mos.
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I The effect of loan growth on high-equity banks is determined by adding the coefficient from the
GROWTHvariable and the coefficient from the cross product of GROWTHand EOUITY. An F
test is used to determine if the sum is significantly different from zero
••• Significant at the .01 level
n s.-Not significant
Of course, it would IK' :In ()\'ergeneralization
to sUte that any increase in thl' loan growth rate
will le:ld to higher charge-off r:llcs Loan grmnh
during :111 cconomic expansion is to hc expected
:IS 10:111 dl'mand incrl'ases FurlhLTmore. the
e\ ilil'nce indicates that thi.s rcLition.ship m:l~, not
hoiLl for hanks 'i\"ith ah()\'c<l\ LTagl' equity-asset
r:ltios. Therl'fore, as statl'd aho\c, incrcases in
loan growth rates are only :1 signal of possihle
dl'c1incs in loan quality, and such declines will
not nl'cessarily occur in cVl'ry clse.
Thc rl'Lltionship hl'twl'en growth and quality
pLices an additional hureil'n on h:lI1k officers and
directors to manage gro\\ th cln_·full). The usual
measures of loan qualit\, arc distorted ';\'hen
gro\\'lh rates change_ :\lan:lgers :lI1d directors nel'd
to adjust for these distortions :lI1d l'xplore new
methods to measure and control risk. Further-
more, dl'lermining the source of the loan growth
is l'specially important in :Issessing risk. A grow-
ing economy, a speculati\'e huhhle, :1 shift in
market sharl'. or a perpetration of fraud can all
gl'netatc loan grcm·th. hut the results are quite
different. Finally. the resources dl'\,(ltl'd to market-
ing and (Tl'dit administration need to hl' carefully
haJanl'l'd to pre\"cnt even good loans from
hecoming trouhled assets.
Because the preliminary evidencc suggests
that loan growth is a determinant of loan quality,
hank l'xaminers could use this information to bl'
more effectivc in the examination process. Gro';\,th
20
may he one hctor among sl'\'eral to consieiL..r wlll'n
scheduling the frequency or examinations. FUl1her-
more. growth m:\y he :1 red llag that indicltes
\\ hich :Ireas of a hank's portfolio arc most in need
or \.·xamination for crcdit quality issues.
Thl' different :lppro:lches to generating loan
grc)\\ th had difTerl'nt dkcts on loan quality. As
sho\\ n ahm'e, expanding the loan portfolio
thlOugh increased 1l'l1lling to ne';\' or existing
customers tends to improvl' the charge-off r:lte
initially, hut eventually it has a negative effect.
Cro\\·th through the :Icquisilion of failed IXlI1ks
\\ ith FDIC assistance tl'nds to improve loan qu:dity,
me;lsurl'd hy l'itlwr nonpcrforIning loan ratios or
charge-off rates. GrO\\ Ih through mergers \vith
othl'r IXlI1ks 10\\ er.s loan quality ';\'hen measurl'd
hy thl' charge-off ratl'. hut it.s effect on thl' non-
performing ratio is kss cl'rtain If a bank wishes
10 grow and to il11prove loan quality, growth
through the acquisition of failed hanks appears
to he superior to growth through merger Of
course, this result is hasl'd on Texas banking data
for :1 pl'riocl of rapid hank gnmth follm\'l'd hy
nUl11erous hank failures.
The cause of this difference be[';\'l'en hank
mergl'r ancl failed-hank acquisition is likely to he
the assistance givl'1l hy Ihe FDIC to the acquirer
or a railed bank. Typically, the FDIC is liberal in
r\.'l11o\'ing low-quality :lssets from the books of
Lliied banks or in allowing the acquiring hank to
return 10\\'-quality aSSl'ts to the FDIC after the
Federal Reserve Bank ofDallasacquisition. If hankers are averse to risk, the credit
quality certainty provided by the FDIC would he
considered highly valuable.
These results suggest that there may be a bias
toward banking consolidation to take place through
the acquisition of failed banks, rather than through
mergers of solvent hanks. Even after an acquiring
bank has decided on an acquisition target, it may
delay the acquisition if, in its assessment, the target
bank is likely to fail and can be acquired with the
FDIC removing the troubled loans from the current
loan portfolio. The acquiring bank will trade off the
benefits ofcurrent acquisition with the benefit of
greater credit quality certainty in the future with an
FDIC assistance package. Of course, the acquiring
bank also takes the risk of possibly not submitting
the winning hid to the FDIC.
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Such a bias could slow the rate of much-
needed consolidation in the banking industry.
The U.S. banking industry needs banking con-
solidation, because it offers one of the best
approaches to increasing the diversity of bank
portfolios and increasing the efficiency in the
provision of banking services eClair, Tucker, and
Siems 1991). It is possible that the rate of con-
solidation may be slowed by the rate at which
the FDIC can close failed banks. If FDIC resolu-
tion procedures for failed banks are slowing the
rate of consolidation, these procedures need to
be reexamined. The nation's interests are un-
likely to be served by drawing out the process
of consolidation.
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